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“V.I.P.” VIDEOGRAPHER INTIMIDATION PROTECTION:
HOW THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROTECT CITIZENS
WHO VIDEOTAPE THE POLICE
David Murphy

*

I. INTRODUCTION
With each passing day, more incidents involving police officers,
private citizens, and video cameras are emerging on the Internet,
making the news, and sometimes appearing on civil and criminal
1
dockets. When individuals bring these incidents to public attention,
more people seek to record police activity, which creates more
2
opportunities for police officers to intimidate videographers. On
YouTube, an Internet user can watch hours of uploaded footage
3
showing police officers aggressively confronting videographers.
These encounters raise questions about police conduct and private
*

J.D. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.B.A. Information
Technology Management, 2010, University of Notre Dame. Special thanks to my
parents, Susan and John Murphy, for their persistent encouragement and support.
1
See, e.g., Hinhin2, Good Cops, Doing Their Job, Professionally, YOUTUBE (Feb. 28,
2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sylrpLhG4w0&NR=1; DanceRooster, How
To Invoke Your Rights With the Police, YOUTUBE (Jan. 23, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0En_sdsyh1M&feature=related;
RidleyReport,
NH: What to Do When Cops Order Camera Shutoff?, YOUTUBE (Dec. 13, 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vLSptMe3yw0&feature=related; Acumensch, Film
Is
Not
A
Crime,
YOUTUBE
(Mar.
7,
2007),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DMDW4Fszj2U.
2
See sources cited supra note 1. The titles of these videos and related posts on
the internet indicate that at least some private citizens are actively filling the role of
providing public oversight of police conduct. As “how to” and other oversight videos
continue to be uploaded and accumulate views, the number of videos being
produced will likely rise, thus increasing the likelihood of confrontations with police
over the use of the video camera.
3
See, e.g., Ccpafl, Cop Watcher Arrested While Filming Police, YOUTUBE (May 9,
2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F_8Bv0wNgCY&feature=related;
RTAmerica, Woman Arrested for Filming Police, YOUTUBE (June 22, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OtJpL2ZdWVI; HellandKeller, Police vs. Civilians
w/
Video
Camera,
YOUTUBE
(Aug.
31,
2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_U1oFcCAZo&feature=related.
By using
keywords like “police,” “intimidation,” and “camera” in the search query, users can
endlessly watch videos of confrontations between private citizens and police officers
regarding the use of video cameras.

319

MURPHY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

320

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

1/9/2013 3:33 PM

[Vol. 43:319

citizens’ rights to film police. Several courts, police departments, and
legal scholars have addressed these questions, but have failed to
reach a consensus as to the legality and practicality of protecting
4
videographers from police intimidation. So, the power to protect
individuals and their rights to film police officers lies in the hands of
state legislatures.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently
5
addressed some of these questions in Glik v. Cunniffe. In Glik, Boston
police officers arrested Simon Glik for using his cellular phone’s
digital video camera to film several police officers arresting a young
6
man.
Glik was subsequently charged with violations of
7
Massachusetts’s Anti-Wiretapping Statute and two other state-law
offenses, which the Court ultimately deemed baseless and thereby
8
dismissed. In doing so, the First Circuit held that the defendant
police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from Glik’s
constitutional claims because Glik had “clearly established First
9
Amendment rights in filming the officers in public space.”
Glik demonstrates that the First Circuit is willing to defend a First
Amendment right to videotape police officers. But not all courts
extend a public right to film police officers, and the precise source of
the right to film police within the First Amendment is somewhat
10
elusive. Arguably, the law is leaning in the direction of “protecting”
individuals who film police officers in public, but police officers may
be actively suppressing the use of video cameras to record police
11
conduct. If a First Amendment right to film police officers exists, or
at least ought to exist, then state legislatures must protect
videographers from overreaching police intimidation.
This Comment discusses police intimidation of videographers
and provides a legislative model that protects videographers who film
police conduct. Part II discusses how filming police in public is
protected First Amendment activity. Part III exposes how the current
legal environment incentivizes police officers to intimidate
videographers who attempt to film police conduct.
Part IV

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

See discussion infra Parts III–IV.
Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011).
Id.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2000).
Glik, 655 F.3d at 79.
Id. at 85.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
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scrutinizes the current framework of deterrents designed to prevent
police misconduct and discusses why these safeguards fail to protect
videographers. Part V recommends a bright-line rule that imposes
harsh punishments to effectively deter police officers from
intimidating law-abiding videographers who capture police conduct
on camera. Lastly, Part VI will conclude this discussion.
II. FILMING POLICE OFFICERS IN PUBLIC AND FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION
This section provides an overview of the ambiguous First
Amendment right to film police in public and discusses how legal
and academic consensus is trending towards enhancing protection
for videographers. Some courts have already held that the First
Amendment protects filming police officers, but these courts have
12
failed to precisely explain this right’s origins and limitations. Other
courts, however, have not recognized a broad right to film police
13
within the First Amendment.
Despite this dissonance, a First
Amendment right to film police officers in public will likely be
recognized in the future based on recent court decisions and legal
14
scholarship.
12

See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586–87 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding
that an Illinois eavesdropping statute “likely violates the First Amendment’s freespeech and free-press guarantees”); Smith v. City of Cummings, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333
(11th Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiffs “had a First Amendment right, subject to
reasonable time, manner and place restrictions, to photograph or videotape police
conduct,” and that the First Amendment “protects the right to gather information
about what public officials do on public property,” but failing to clearly elaborate
where in the First Amendment such a powerful right exists); State v. Graber, No. 12K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *33–34 (Md. Cir. Sept. 27, 2010) (“[S]tatutes
which implicate the free speech protections of the First Amendment must be
narrowly construed.”); but see Ramos v. Flowers, No. A-4910-10T3, 2012 WL 4208699,
at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 21, 2012) (“A documentary about a subject of
public interest, such as urban gangs, is a form of investigative journalism, and the
process of preparing such a documentary is a form of news gathering. For that
reason, those activities are protected by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution . . . .”).
13
See, e.g., Pomykacz v. Borough of W. Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 512–13
n.14 (D.N.J. 2006) (explaining that the act of photographing, by itself, is not
sufficiently communicative and therefore not subject to First Amendment protection,
regardless of whether or not the subject is a public servant).
14
Cf. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 586–87; Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 85 (1st Cir.
2011). See generally Caycee Hampton, Case Comment: Confirmation of a Catch-22: Glik v.
Cunniffe and the Paradox of Citizen Recording, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1549 (2011); Seth F.
Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the
Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 392–403 (2011); Lisa A. Skehill, Cloaking Police
Misconduct in Privacy: Why the Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Statute Should Allow For the
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In relevant part, the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
15
of grievances.”
Although Glik lacked direct reference to the
language of the First Amendment, it recognized an “unambiguous”
right to gather and disseminate information related to matters of
16
public interest, especially police conduct. Likewise, the Supreme
Court has indicated that First Amendment protection extends
beyond the press, and defends individuals like Glik in regard to
17
gathering public information.
But precisely how the First Amendment affords such protection
18
is not clearly established. In Glik, First Circuit Judge Lipez remarked
that “the First Amendment’s aegis extends further than the text’s
proscription on laws ‘abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press,’ and encompasses a range of conduct” related to information
19
gathering and dissemination. To connect these principles to the
filming of police officers in public, the court declared that “[t]he
filming of . . . police officers performing their responsibilities” is a
“cardinal First Amendment interest in protecting and promoting”
information gathering, dissemination, and “free discussion of
20
government affairs.” The court easily categorized Glik’s activity as
Surreptitious Recording of Police Officers, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981 (2009); Howard W.
Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L.
REV. 600 (2009).
15
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16
Glik, 655 F.3d at 85 (“[T]hough not unqualified, a citizen’s right to film
government officials, including law enforcement officers, in the discharge of their
duties in a public space is a basic, vital, and well-established liberty safeguarded by
the First Amendment.”).
17
See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681–82 (1972).
18
See Glik, 655 F.3d at 82. In opinions such as Fordyce, the court merely glanced
over “the First Amendment right to film matters of public interest” without
sufficiently explaining from where the right is derived. Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55
F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995).
19
Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (quoting Belotti, 435 U.S. at 783) (extending the First
Amendment’s reach in Glik by attributing that it “goes beyond protection of the press
and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock
of information from which members of the public may draw”).
20
Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)); see also Smith v. City
of Cummings, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Blackston v. Alabama, 30
F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994)) ( “The First Amendment protects the right to gather
information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a
right to record matters of public interest.”); Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439.
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information gathering and dissemination, but it failed to clearly
indicate why that activity was actually protected by the First
21
Amendment. Circuit Judge Lipez vigorously supported his position
22
with case law like Smith v. City of Cumming and Fordyce v. City of Seattle.
Upon closer inspection, however, those Supreme Court opinions
merely addressed a videographer’s First Amendment rights in
passing, and failed to precisely derive the source of protection from
23
the language of the First Amendment. The majority of the sources
used in Glik are somewhat ambiguous as to how the right to film
matters of public concern is actually protected First Amendment
24
activity.
One source, however, provides more specific insight as to how
the filming of police officers is protected First Amendment activity.
Glik cited Robinson v. Fetterman, which held that individuals have a freespeech right to film police officers in the course of their public
25
26
activities. By at least referencing the Speech Clause, the court in
Robinson modestly provided some legitimate constitutional support
for what Glik would ultimately declare to be a “clearly-established”
27
First Amendment right to film police officers in public.
Branching off from the Speech Clause, some legal scholars have
more thoroughly examined the existence of a First Amendment right

21

See Glik, 655 F.3d at 82.
Id. at 83 (citing Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333; Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439). Amongst
others cited to support the proposition that “the First Amendment protects the
filming of government officials in public spaces” are Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407
F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969), and Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 465 (D.N.H.
1990).
23
Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333 (where the plaintiffs allege that police harassed them
for filming police activity, the court merely stated that it “agreed” that the plaintiffs
had a First Amendment right and provided no further First Amendment analysis).
See generally Fordyce, 55 F.3d 436 (this opinion does not discuss the merits of a First
Amendment right to film but merely rejects the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment since a genuine issue of material fact existed in regard to whether the
plaintiff’s rights were violated when police seized and smashed his camera).
24
See Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 n.11); Gentile v. State
Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1035–36 (1991); Mills, 384 U.S. at 218).
25
Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005)
(“Videotaping is a legitimate means of gathering information for public
dissemination and can often provide cogent evidence . . . . [T]here can be no doubt
that the free speech clause of the Constitution protected Robinson as he videotaped
the [police officers].”).
26
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech”).
27
Glik, 655 F.3d at 79.
22
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28

to film police officers.
The right to gather and disseminate
information may be derived from three elements within the First
Amendment: the Speech Clause (“Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech”); the Press Clause (“or of the
press”); and the Petition Clause (“the right of the people . . . to
29
petition the Government for a redress of grievances”). The Speech
Clause protects the direct dissemination of speech—”dissemination”
may be the speech itself or conduct that necessarily facilitates the
30
speech.
Similarly, the Press Clause is interpreted to protect
reasonable conduct antecedent to expression, such as legitimate
31
means of news gathering.
Lastly, the Petition Clause protects
information gathering for private citizens seeking the resolution of
32
legal disputes and for the general purposes of self-governance.
Conceivably, filming police officers could satisfy all three First
Amendment clauses that form the right to gather and disseminate
information. Hypothetically, a videographer could decide to make a
documentary about the state of law enforcement in his community by
video-recording the local police on duty. The videographer’s
commentary about law enforcement would be the “speech” itself in
satisfaction of the Speech Clause and, absent additional conduct
33
warranting police intervention, would be facially reasonable. The
Press Clause would protect the actual act of filming the police officers
in public because it is a necessary and common means of news
34
gathering.
Lastly, since a documentary could comment on law
28

Wasserman, supra note 14, at 665.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30
ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 797–99 (9th Cir. 2006).
31
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (“We do not question the
significance of free speech, press, or assembly to the country’s welfare. Nor is it
suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection;
without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated.”); Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information:
Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J.
249, 354 (2004) (noting that the Speech Clause and Press Clause may not even be
separate sources of the right to disseminate information, but the traditional press’s
news gathering conduct receives extensive First Amendment protection).
32
See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2494 (2011); Sure-Tan,
Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 896–97 (1984); see also McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479,
483 (1985) (“The values in the right of petition as an important aspect of selfgovernment are beyond question.”).
33
See Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 158 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Taking
photographs at a public event is a facially innocent act.”).
34
See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The act of
making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily included within the First
Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to
29
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enforcement, the film would have a general purpose for self35
governance, thus satisfying the Petition Clause. Albeit somewhat
simplistic, this model illustrates how filming police is activity
protected directly by the language of the First Amendment itself.
Alternatively, instead of focusing on a right to gather and
disseminate information, some scholars argue that a right to film
36
police officers can be derived from “freedom of expression.” For
instance, captured images from photography or video-recording can
be “like words inscribed on parchment” and therefore fall within the
37
realm of First Amendment protection.
The analogy is that a
38
videographer is to his recording as a writer is to his writings. Since
the government cannot interfere with a writer chronicling his
thoughts and beliefs, likewise the government cannot disrupt a
39
videographer recording in public. Courts, however, have rejected
this view, stating that because no idea is communicated through mere
recordings, images and videos are not necessarily forms or means of

disseminate the resulting recording) (emphasis in original); Robinson v. Fetterman,
378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005). Filming or videotaping is an essential part
of reporting information and without the right to video-record, information
gathering could not possibly be as effective as it is. Id. (“Videotaping is a legitimate
means of gathering information for public dissemination . . . .”); Ramos v. Flowers,
No. A-4910-10T3, 2012 WL 4208699, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 21, 2012)
(“A documentary about a subject of public interest, such as urban gangs, is a form of
investigative journalism, and the process of preparing such a documentary is a form
of news gathering. For that reason, those activities are protected by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . .”).
35
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 597 (“‘[T]here is practically universal agreement that a
major purpose of’ the First Amendment ‘was to protect the free discussion of
government affairs’ . . . .”) (quoting Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennet, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2828 (2011) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14
(1976))); Ramos, 2012 WL 4208699, at *9 (“Gathering information about
government officials in a form that can readily be disseminated to others serves a
cardinal First Amendment interest in protecting and promoting ‘free discussion of
government affairs.’” (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966))). Debate
on public issues should be uninhibited even if they include unpleasant attacks and
scrutiny on the government and public officials. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 74–75 (1964) (“For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression;
it is the essence of self-government. . . . [D]ebate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”).
36
See Kreimer, supra note 14, at 379.
37
Id.
38
See id.
39
Id. (“The government is barred from intermeddling . . . in both speech and
thought . . . [which] undergird the constitutional commitments to personal
autonomy and popular sovereignty.”).
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40

expression that warrant protection.
In determining whether an
isolated expression was protectable as “symbolic speech,” courts have
weighed the presence or absence of a “message conveyed” in the act
41
that could constitute expression. Compared to the right to gather
and disseminate information, the freedom of expression argument is
somewhat weaker.
Overall, although courts have failed to sufficiently discern a First
Amendment right to film police officers in public, a solid argument
exists for such a right. The right to gather and disseminate
information derived from the Speech Clause, the Press Clause, and
the Petition Clause fairly applies to situations like Glik, where a
concerned citizen publicly seeks to document the activity of law
42
enforcement officers with his video camera. Thus, the right to film
police officers in public has at least some identifiable roots in the
plain language of the First Amendment.
III. INCENTIVES FOR POLICE OFFICERS TO INTIMIDATE VIDEOGRAPHERS
Despite “sweeping” decisions like Glik that strongly protect
43
videographers’ rights, police engage in arrests and intimidation
tactics to suppress videographers from filming police conduct in
44
public. This Part focuses on three aspects of the legal environment
which compel some police officers to actively confront, intimidate,
and even arrest individuals for filming police conduct in a public
space: first, how police are often threatened by videographers;
40

Montefusco v. Nassau Cnty., 39 F. Supp. 2d 231, 241–42 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
(stating that to warrant protection, “there must still be (1) a message to be
communicated and (2) an audience to receive that message regardless of the
medium in which the message is sought to be expressed. . . . [I]f either is lacking,
there is absolutely nothing to transmit from ‘mind to mind’”); see also Hurley v. IrishAm. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974);
Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996). But see Alvarez, 679 F,3d at
596 (“[W]e have never seriously questioned that the process of writing words down
on paper, painting a picture, and playing an instrument are purely expressive
activities entitled to full First Amendment protection.”).
41
See Montefusco, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 241–42; Kreimer, supra note 14, at 371.
42
See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011).
43
Erica Goode, New Tool for Police, the Video Camera, and New Legal Issues to Go With
It, GOUPSTATE.COM (Oct. 11, 2011) http://www.goupstate.com/article/20111011
/ZNYT02/110113009/1088/sports?p=4&tc=pg&tc=ar.
44
ReasonTV, The Government’s War on Cameras!, YOUTUBE (May 26, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=LY0MUARqisM#!
(interviewing Professor Eugene Volokh, who remarks “as it happens, the unfortunate
reality is that often officers can intimidate people into not doing things they
otherwise legally could”).
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second, the advantages police wish to maintain in courtrooms; and,
lastly, the confusing state of anti-wiretapping statutes and laws of
general applicability which often falsely justify arrests. Because of
these three conditions, police officers will likely continue to suppress
individuals who attempt to capture police conduct on video unless
state legislatures enact changes that protect videographers’ First
Amendment rights.
Police are often uncomfortable and threatened by civilians with
45
video cameras. The basic reality is that some police officers do not
appreciate being videotaped, which results in aggressive reactions
46
from police officers toward videographers. Generally, “[p]olice, like
many civilians, are often camera-shy” and “dislike being recorded in
embarrassing situations and may be concerned that dissemination of
47
their images may put them at risk of retaliation.”
Additionally,
police officers often view videography as a challenge to their
48
authority. Considering those challenges to authority and the fear of
retaliation, the problem for police is how to respond when every
49
citizen is a potential threat of surveillance and scrutiny. Police face
potential bombardment from videographers because recording
50
devices are cheaper and handier than ever. Due to the proliferation
of inexpensive recording technology, police encounters in public are
more commonly captured on portable media that can be
disseminated almost instantly, allowing the public to constantly
51
scrutinize and form opinions about the police.
45

See, e.g., HellandKeller, supra note 3 (where the filmed police officer admitted,
in apologizing to the videographers after they had a discussion with his superior, that
he “was trying to intimidate” the videographers).
46
See id.
47
Kreimer, supra note 14, at 357.
48
See Daniel Rowinski, Police Fight Cellphone Recordings, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 12, 2010,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/01/12/police_fig
ht_cellphone_recordings/?page=full (quoting David Ardia, Director of the Citizen
Media Law Project at Harvard’s Berman Center for Internet and Society, “[p]olice
are not used to ceding power, and [video cameras] are forcing them to cede
power”).
49
Kevin Johnson, For Cops, Citizen Videos Bring Increased Scrutiny, USA TODAY, Oct.
18, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-10-15-1Avideocops15_CV_N
.htm (quoting San Jose Police Chief Rob Davis, “[t]here is no city not at risk of a
video showing an officer doing something wrong . . . [t]he question, when one of
these videos do surface, is what we do about it”).
50
Wasserman, supra note 14, at 617–18 (“Technological improvement means
that recorded evidence of police-public encounters, good and bad, will be the norm,
more frequent and more widely disseminated, within and without the news media.”).
51
See Ray Sanchez, Growing Number of Prosecutions for Videotaping the Police, ABC
NEWS, July 19, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/US/TheLaw/videotaping-cops-
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52

Police assert that this trend threatens certain societal interests.
53
Jim Pasco, the executive director of the Fraternal Order of Police,
remarked that the proliferation of cheap video equipment has “a
chilling effect on some officers who are now afraid to act for fear of
54
retribution by video.” Pasco’s statement implies that video causes
55
police officers to second-guess themselves before they act.
Additionally, Pasco’s statement indicates that police officers either act
differently or less deliberately when they know their conduct is not
being recorded. If a police officer knew that his conduct was lawful,
justified, and otherwise correct, he probably would not hesitate from
acting regardless of whether a videographer was digitally capturing
his conduct. A police officer’s hesitation while a videographer
records his conduct reinforces the argument that filming police
officers in public causes police officers to lawfully and thoughtfully
conduct police business. Pasco and the police seem to consider
recorded observation of police conduct as a defect of society’s new
power to digitally record in public, but perhaps it is actually a positive
56
feature that reduces occurrences of police misconduct.
As the voice of the world’s largest organization of law
57
enforcement officers, Pasco established that some police feel
58
threatened by the concept that they are under surveillance. In an
interview with Reason Magazine’s Radley Balko, Pasco supported the
arrest/story?id=11179076#.TrW-BXKwXf8; Keith B. Richburg, New York’s Video
Vigilante, Scourge of Parking Enforcers, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/02
/AR2008080201503.html (describing the increasing trend of amateur videos of
police conduct on YouTube).
52
Johnson, supra note 49 (reporting that some police organizations believe
“videotaping officers poses broad risks that reach beyond Internet embarrassments:
It could cause officers to hesitate in life-threatening situations”).
53
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, http://www.fop.net (last visited Aug. 25, 2012)
(“The Fraternal Order of Police is the world’s largest organization of sworn law
enforcement officers, with more than 325,000 members in more than 2,100 lodges.
We are the voice of those who dedicate their lives to protecting and serving our
communities. . . . [N]o one knows police officers better than the FOP.”).
54
Johnson, supra note 49.
55
See id.
56
Radley Balko, Police Officers Don’t Check Their Civil Rights at the Station House
Door, REASON (Aug. 9, 2010), http://reason.com/archives/2010/08/09/policeofficers-dont-check-the (referencing how the Washington Post, USA Today, the
Washington Examiner, the Washington Times, and other commentators have “all
weighed in on the side that citizen photography and videography can be an
important check to keep police officers accountable and transparent”).
57
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, supra note 53.
58
See Johnson, supra note 49.
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arrests of individuals like Anthony Graber, who faced over fifteen
years in prison for filming his own traffic stop, because the video
60
could be manipulated to negatively portray police officers. Pasco
elaborated that civilian video could be edited or taken out of context,
and when the video is not in the custody or control of law
61
enforcement, it is rightly inadmissible as evidence. Further, Pasco
asserted that “[l]etting people record police officers is an extreme
and intrusive response to a problem that’s so rare it might as well not
exist. It would be like saying we should do away with DNA evidence
62
because there’s a one in a billion chance that it could be wrong.”
The “problem” that Pasco is referring to is police misconduct that is
63
uncovered by civilian videography. Overall, if Pasco truly represents
the largest law enforcement organization in the world, then his
statements suggest that the law-enforcement community views the act
64
of filming a police officer as “extreme and intrusive.” This anxiety
explains why police officers may act particularly aggressively toward
videographers.
One reason why video threatens police officers is that civilian
recordings have revealed serious inconvenient truths and exposed
horrible incidents of police misconduct—most notably, the Rodney
65
King incident.
Arguably, prohibitions on video recording and
59

Balko, supra note 56; see State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct.
LEXIS 7, at *4–5 (Md. Cir. Sept. 27, 2010). Maryland state police officers raided
Anthony Graber’s home, confiscated his camera, computers, and hard drive, and
arrested him for violating state wiretap laws when he posted the video of himself
being pulled over by a gun-wielding undercover police officer on YouTube. Sanchez,
supra note 51. Maryland Circuit Court Judge Emory A. Pitt, Jr. dismissed the case
reasoning that law enforcement officers enjoy a very narrow expectation of privacy in
the performance of their duties. Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *7–8; see also
Peter Hermann, Judge Says Man Within Rights to Record Police Traffic Stop, BALT. SUN,
Sept. 27, 2010, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-09-27/news/bs-md-recordedtraffic-stop-20100927_1_police-officers-plitt-cell-phones; Anthony Graber, Cop Pulls
Out
Gun
On
Motorcyclist,
YOUTUBE
(June
5,
2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RK5bMSyJCsg.
60
Balko, supra note 56.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
See id.
64
Id. Pasco is not referring to conduct surrounding recording of police officers,
just the act of recording alone. Id. (Pasco remarks “[y]ou have 960,000 police
officers in this country, and millions of contacts between those officers and citizens.
I’ll bet you can’t name 10 incidents [sic] where a citizen video has shown a police
officer to have lied on a police report. . . . Letting people record police officers is an
extreme and intrusive response to a problem that’s so rare it might as well not
exist.”).
65
See Jim Kavanagh, Rodney King, 20 Years Later, CNN (Mar. 3, 2011),
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66

image capture “are deployed to suppress inconvenient truths.” The
police’s desire to censor videographers suggests that police officers
are interested in controlling public perception of their conduct, and
not just interferences with police business. Because police record
their own conduct at nearly all times they are on duty, justifications
for censoring videographers from recording the exact same conduct
67
seem unreasonable. Police previously enjoyed a monopoly over the
ability to record public confrontations using cameras in cruisers and
68
recording equipment attached to officers. The power to record,
however, is no longer unilaterally in police possession because private
69
citizens can cheaply record police actions with minimal effort. The
potential First Amendment rights in filming police, the broad
availability of recording devices, and the cultural obsession with
posting personal videos on the internet eliminate any shroud of
secrecy that police could maintain in publicly discharging their
70
duties. This threatening environment encourages police officers to
either act appropriately at all times because they are under
surveillance, or intimidate videographers to reduce any incentives to
71
film police conduct. Thus, some police officers seek to deter the
public from filming their conduct because that conduct may be
illegal, while others, like Pasco, find the act of recording police to be
72
inherently intrusive. It is for these reasons that police officers are
incentivized to confront, intimidate, and arrest videographers.
When the biggest threats to police credibility were merely
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-03/us/rodney.king.20.years.later_1_laurencepowell-theodore-briseno-king-attorney-milton-grimes?_s=PM:US;
see
also
Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 971–72 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting) (commenting on the importance of George Holliday’s infamous
recording of the Rodney King incident).
66
Kreimer, supra note 14, at 383.
67
Wasserman, supra note 14, at 651 (“[T]he basic act of recording officers in the
performance of their official duties does not burden the officers or interfere with
their ability to execute their offices.”); Goode, supra note 43.
68
INT’L. ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, THE IMPACT OF VIDEO EVIDENCE ON MODERN
POLICING 13–26 (2004), available at http://cops.usdoj.gov/publications/video
_evidence.pdf (“Attorneys representing [police] agencies categorically support the
use of the in-car camera. They pointed out that video evidence allows them to save
time in case disposition. On rare occasions, after reviewing the video evidence, they
decided to settle the case in lieu of proceeding to trial. . . . The presence of video
evidence allow[s] the agency to defend the officer with great success.”).
69
See Rowinski, supra note 48 (“[T]he proliferation of cellphone and other
technology has equipped people to record actions in public.”).
70
Id.
71
See Balko, supra note 56.
72
Id.
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eyewitness accounts of an incident, police could at least attempt to
73
plausibly deny embarrassing or illegal conduct. Once the availability
of portable recordable media exploded, however, police officers lost
the advantages of plausibility, deniability, and controlled
74
documentation of the incident.
In “he said, she said” factual
disputes, police officers are usually given the benefit of the doubt
75
during proceedings. In forming the record, police are accustomed
to receiving substantial deference, and many prefer to be in a
position where they can shape the perception of their actions without
76
competing against a digital record. In cases of police misconduct,
the facts are often reduced to a citizen’s word against the police
77
officer’s word. Juries are more inclined to believe police officers
78
over ordinary citizens.
Therefore, prior to the proliferation of
recording devices, police officers maintained a strategic advantage in
creating the record.
As portable videography spreads, police lose this strategic
courtroom advantage. For instance, after the Prince George’s County
riot police beat Jack McKenna, police officers provided sworn
statements that McKenna “struck [the] officers and their horses,
79
causing minor injuries.”
These sworn statements were directly
contradicted by amateur video footage of the incident, which
indisputably demonstrated that McKenna never touched the police
73

See INT’L ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 68, at 5–6 (discussing the
history of video recording in police cruisers, effectively beginning in the 1980s).
74
See Rowinski, supra note 48.
75
See Sanchez, supra note 51 (quoting James Green, an attorney for the ACLU of
Florida, who remarked that “[j]udges and juries want to believe law
enforcement[;] . . . they want to believe police officers and unless you have credible
evidence to contradict police officers, it’s often very difficult to believe the word of a
citizen over a police officer.” The ACLU filed a First Amendment lawsuit on behalf
of Sharron Tasha Ford after she was arrested for videotaping an encounter between
police and her teenage son at a movie theater).
76
Kreimer, supra note 14, at 357.
77
See, e.g., Youa Vang Lee v. Anderson, Civ. No. 07-1205, 2009 WL 1287832, at *9
(D. Minn. May 6, 2009) (concluding, despite heavily disputed facts, that both the
police officer who shot the plaintiff’s son and the city were entitled to summary
judgment because the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence of a policy or custom
as the cause of the police officer’s alleged misconduct).
78
See Skehill, supra note 14, at 998; Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse:
Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753,
764–65 (1993); Wasserman, supra note 14, at 618.
79
Bradley Blackburn, University of Maryland Student Brutally Beaten By Police After
Basketball Game, ABC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/videoshows-university-maryland-student-beaten-countypolice/story?id=10362033#.TrYI7HKwXf8.
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officers or their horses, and was instead calmly retreating when
multiple riot police battered him against a wall and beat him with
80
batons as he lay on the ground. Ultimately, the state dropped all
charges against McKenna, and the Prince George’s County Police
81
Chief, Roberto Hylton, suspended one police officer.
As the McKenna case illustrates, police officers can lose their
credibility very quickly if outside recordings are brought to the
attention of the public and the court. Video evidence is so effective
because the images provide a “direct, unmediated view of the reality
they depict,” and viewers, such as jury members, are more likely to
accept those images as “credible representations” of how events
82
actually transpired.
Compared to verbal descriptions of events,
images are often more powerful for the viewer because the character
83
When officers are caught
of the medium is self-authenticating.
“blatantly contradict[ing]” video evidence, the result is fierce public
criticism and sometimes suspension, firing, embarrassment, and/or
84
civil damages. Thus, expanding the availability of video reduces the
likelihood that a police officer can successfully make a false
statement.
Additionally, video evidence is particularly important in
resolving civil rights claims that follow allegations of police
misconduct. For example, video evidence can drastically change the
85
outcomes of § 1983 civil rights actions because courts understand
video evidence as “singularly powerful” and “an unambiguous source

80

Id.; Roberts and Wood Law, Beating and Arrest of Jack McKenna - April 3, 2011,
YOUTUBE (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zcrnnmt8cg8.
81
Blackburn, supra note 79.
82
See Wasserman, supra note 14, at 619 (quoting RICHARD K. SHERWIN, POPULAR
CULTURE AND LAW xiv (Richard K. Sherwin ed., 2006)).
83
ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A]udio and
audiovisual recording are uniquely reliable and powerful methods of preserving and
disseminating news and information about events that occur in public. Their selfauthenticating character makes it highly unlikely that other methods could be
considered reasonably adequate substitutes.”); Kreimer, supra note 14, at 386.
84
See Wasserman, supra note 14, at 651–52 (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted); see also Trymaine Lee, Police Officer Who Shoved a Bicyclist Is Off the Job,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at A24. But see Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 343 (1983)
(establishing that police officers who commit perjury have an absolute immunity
against suits for money damages because allowing officers to be sued for their
testimony as witnesses “might undermine not only their contribution to the judicial
process but also the effective performance of their other public duties”).
85
See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (discussing how the
“existence in the record of a videotape capturing the events in question” is an “added
wrinkle” to the resolution of the case).
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86

of proof.” Fundamentally, video is perceived as truthful, objective,
and generally clear, which often gives the video evidence dispositive
87
weight in determining the outcome of the civil rights claim.
Because videography has this power, police are tempted to preserve
their advantage in recording by preventing outside videographers
88
from ever capturing police conduct in the first place.
Since a
videographer may capture police misconduct that the officer cannot
plausibly deny, police have to choose between acting appropriately
and preventing the creation of evidence of misconduct.
Consequently, some police officers have chosen the latter option,
which can result in intimidation, harassment, and sometimes the
89
arrest of otherwise law-abiding videographers.
When police officers arrest videographers, the videographers
90
often demand justification for their arrest.
Police officers
91
commonly cite either the local jurisdiction’s anti-wiretapping statute
86

Wasserman, supra note 14, at 607; see also Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607; Marvin v.
City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 239–40 (6th Cir. 2007); Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d
1260, 1262 n.1 (11th Cir. 2007).
87
Wasserman, supra note 14, at 607.
88
See Rowinski, supra note 48.
89
See sources cited supra note 3.
90
See supra note 3.
91
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2006); ALA. CODE § 13A-11-31 (1975); ALASKA STAT.
ANN. § 42.20.310 (West 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3005 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-60-120 (West 2008); CAL. PENAL CODE § 631 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9304 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-189 (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 1335 (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1162 (West 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1111 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 186702 (West 2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2 (West 2006); IND. CODE § 35-33.5-1
(2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 727.8 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101 (West 2008);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 526.020 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1303 (West 2005);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 710 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402
(West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.539 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.02 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 542.402 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
200.650 (West 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:156A-3 (West 2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05 (McKinney 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 15A-287 (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-15-02 (West 2008); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 29533.52 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 176.3 (West
2002); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.540 (West 2003); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5703 (West
2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-35-21 (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-29-20 (2003);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-35A-20 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-601 (West 2011);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-402 (West 2004);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-62 (West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030 (West 2010);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1D-3 (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.31 (West 2007). States
missing from this list are Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Wyoming.
Vermont does not have an anti-wiretapping statute in effect. For a discussion on the
problems with state wiretap laws, see Marianne F. Kies, Policing the Police: Freedom of the
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or general laws, such as obstruction of justice or failure to obey a
92
police order. Because of the confusing state of these laws, especially
the anti-wiretapping statutes, citizens are often unaware of precisely
how the law applies to their conduct, thereby allowing police officers
93
to use this ignorance to intimidate videographers. Although police
may argue otherwise, no law directly prohibits a videographer from
94
filming or photographing things in public.
Nevertheless, some
police still attempt to combat the spread of public surveillance of
police conduct through other existing statutes and “creative
95
prosecutorial discretion.”
96
Police often rely on anti-wiretapping statutes to arrest civilians
97
who insist on recording police officers without their consent. In
most states and under federal jurisdiction, the anti-wiretapping
statutes only require one party to consent for legal recording or
98
eavesdropping of a communication. In these “one-party-consent”
jurisdictions, if one person involved in the communication consents
to the recording—including the person recording the

Press, the Right to Privacy, and Civilian Recordings of Police Activity, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
274 (2011). For a discussion on whether state wiretap laws violate the First
Amendment, see ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586–87, 595–608 (7th Cir.
2012) (concluding that the Illinois eavesdropping statute “restricts a medium of
expression commonly used for the preservation and communication of information
and ideas, thus triggering [heightened] First Amendment scrutiny.”).
92
Stossel,
The
War
On
Cameras,
YOUTUBE
(Apr.
23,
2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Eu0E1znMZM&feature=related
(interviewing
Radley Balko, Senior Editor of Reason Magazine).
93
See State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *6 (Md. Cir.
Sept. 27, 2010) (where Judge Pitt remarked that Maryland’s anti-wiretap statute “on
its face is unconstitutional; that it is unconstitutional and violative of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution”); The Government’s War on Cameras!,
supra note 44 (interviewing Professor Eugene Volokh, who adds that “not everybody
knows what the law is, and sometimes not even all the police officers know what the
law is”).
94
See The Government’s War on Cameras!, supra note 44 (quoting Professor Eugene
Volokh: “[I]n the jurisdictions of which I am aware, there is no prohibition on videorecording or photographing things when you are standing in a public place and
you’re looking at another public place”).
95
See Kreimer, supra note 14, at 357.
96
For examples of such statutes, see supra note 91.
97
See Kreimer, supra note 14, at 378.
98
See supra note 91. Only twelve jurisdictions in the United States have “all-party
consent” requirements in their wiretap statute. These jurisdictions are: California,
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Washington. See The Government’s War on
Cameras!, supra note 44; see also Stossel, supra note 92.
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99

communication—the conduct is legal. Assuming the videographer
is consenting to his own action, police cannot reasonably expect to
prosecute or arrest a videographer in “one-party-consent”
jurisdictions for anti-wiretapping reasons. Massachusetts and eleven
other jurisdictions (hereinafter, the “all-party-consent” jurisdictions),
however, criminalize recording unless every party in the
100
communication consents to the recording.
Among “all-party-consent” jurisdictions, the issue of whether or
not police officers are protected by anti-wiretapping laws is hotly
101
debated. Some jurisdictions require that parties have a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” in their communication in order to receive
102
protection from anti-wiretapping statutes.
A strong argument that
is used in these jurisdictions is that police officers do not have a
“reasonable expectation of privacy” when conducting police business
103
in public.
Police officers ought not to expect privacy in public
communication because of the public interest in police oversight,
along with the fact that police communications in the line of public
duty are generally less intimate than communications in other
104
contexts.
In addressing this issue, some courts have found that
police cannot enjoy a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the
99

See
Indiana
Recording
Law,
CITIZEN
MEDIA
LAW
PROJECT,
http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/indiana/indiana-recording-law (last visited
Sept. 21, 2012) (explaining that “you may record a telephone conversation if you are
a party to the conversation or you get permission from one party to the
conversation”). The purpose of the anti-wiretapping statutes in “one-party-consent”
jurisdictions is to prevent a third party from recording a private conversation
between two individuals without their consent. See id.
100
See sources cited supra note 91.
101
Compare Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 966 (Mass. 2001) (rejecting
the argument that police are exempt from anti-wiretapping laws because they lack
reasonable expectations of privacy in public communications), with Hornberger v.
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 799 A.2d 566, 595 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (discussing
how the New Jersey statute allows for members of the public to secretly record
conversations when the speakers have no reasonable expectation of privacy).
102
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006); Hornberger, 799 A.2d at 595.
103
See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 965 (where the defendant validly, but unsuccessfully,
argued that police officers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
words during a traffic stop).
104
See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 605–06 (7th Cir. 2012) (discussing
how the privacy interests protected by the Illinois anti-wiretapping statute are “not at
issue” because “[t]he ACLU want[ed] to openly audio record police officers
performing their duties in public places and speaking at a volume audible to
bystanders. Communications of this sort lack any ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”); Dina Mishra, Undermining Excessive Privacy
For Police: Citizen Tape Recording To Check Police Officers’ Power, 117 YALE L.J. 1549, 1555
(2008).

MURPHY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

336

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

1/9/2013 3:33 PM

[Vol. 43:319

public discharge of their duties, while other courts have found that
an expectation of privacy is not necessary for a violation of an anti105
In jurisdictions which require a
wiretapping statute to occur.
reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy, most courts have
found that police officers are public officials, and as such, are not
afforded a reasonable expectation of privacy in the public discharge
106
of their duties.
Another element of confusion is the differentiation between
107
video and audio recording. Many jurisdictions that do not require
“all-party-consent” may still require that all parties to the
communication be put on notice that the conversation is being
108
recorded. A party may provide notice by showing a video camera in
109
Furthermore, for conduct to be covered by an antiplain sight.
wiretapping statute, it may also need to be an “oral communication,”
which may exclude video from the scope of the anti-wiretapping
110
statute.
In Glik, the police officer, assuming Massachusetts’s antiwiretapping statute only applied to audio, asked Glik if his cellular
111
phone recorded audio.
It was only after Glik answered in the
affirmative that police officers arrested him under the color of the
112
anti-wiretapping statute. In resolving Glik, the First Circuit failed to
differentiate between the audio and video aspects of Glik’s

105

See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 965 (upholding Michael Hyde’s conviction because the
legislature expressly established a ban on surreptitious recording to protect privacy,
even for police officers). But see State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct.
LEXIS 7, at *35 (Md. Cir. Sept. 27, 2010) (“Those of us who are public officials and
are entrusted with the power of the state . . . should not expect our actions to be
shielded from public observation. ‘Seq duis custodiet ipsos custodies?’ (Who watches
the watchmen?)”).
106
See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 606–07; Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 258
(3d Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2004); O’Brien v.
DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976); Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *17;
Hornberger, 799 A.2d at 595; Agnew v. Dupler, 717 A.2d 519, 523–24 (Pa. 1998); State
v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). Cf. Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (establishing that individuals do not have a reasonable
expectations of privacy in what they “knowingly expose[] to the public”).
107
See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 2011) (describing how the police
officer only arrested Glik for illegal recording after he acknowledged that his cellular
phone recorded audio).
108
See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.540 (West 2003); State v. Neff, 265 P.3d 62, 63–64
(Or. Ct. App. 2011).
109
Glik, 655 F.3d at 87.
110
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2000).
111
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2000); Glik, 655 F.3d at 79.
112
Glik, 655 F.3d at 79.
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113

recording. Instead, the court simply declared that Glik had a “well
established” right to film police officers in public without indicating
precisely which aspect of Glik’s conduct was protected First
114
Amendment activity.
Overall, anti-wiretapping statutes are valuable tools for police
officers seeking to suppress videographers. Since the laws lack clarity
and well-defined scope, police can creatively and effectively cite antiwiretapping statutes to intimidate even savvy videographers. Yet, if
police do not assert charges from these anti-wiretapping statutes, they
115
still have laws of general applicability at their disposal.
Laws of general applicability include charges like obstruction of
justice, disobeying an officer, obstructing an investigation, interfering
with an officer, failure to obey an officer, disorderly conduct, resisting
116
arrest, obstructing a street, and harassment.
While many of these
charges may be dismissed, videographers are still arrested, placed
117
Videographers
into squad cars, and carted away from the scene.
may be fully within their rights to videotape the police, but after one
confrontation they may expect intimidation, harassment, or arrest
because in most cases “nothing” happens to the police officers who
118
make false arrests.
Police are increasingly using laws of general
applicability to suppress videographers from filming police conduct
because citizens often do not know or understand the laws, thereby
allowing police to think they can get away with applying the
119
charges.
Overall, the inconvenience and embarrassment of being
arrested creates a chilling effect for videographers, which makes laws
of general applicability another valuable tool for police officers
120
seeking to suppress videographers from filming police conduct.
113

Id.
Id. at 85.
115
See Stossel, supra note 92; Kreimer, supra note 14, at 361 (“Where wiretap
prohibitions do not apply, officers faced with defiant videographers frequently turn
to broader criminal statutes that provide substantial enforcement discretion.”).
116
Stossel, supra note 92.
117
Id.
118
Id. (quoting Radley Balko from the interview).
119
Kreimer, supra note 14, at 394 (“[O]ne growing source of litigation is the
tendency of police officers to arrest photographers on trumped-up charges both as a
way of preventing the spread of inconvenient truths and as a response to free-floating
anxiety about individuals who remind officials of terrorists.”); The Government’s War
on Cameras!, supra note 44.
120
See Wasserman, supra note 14, at 648–49 (“Government might stop people
from recording public encounters . . . through enactment and enforcement of
express prohibitions on secret or unconsented-to recordings of persons and
conversations . . . [or] through officers’ efforts to move filmers away from the scene,
114
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IV. SAFEGUARDS TO POLICE MISCONDUCT ARE INEFFECTIVELY
PROTECTING VIDEOGRAPHERS
When Radley Balko said that “nothing” happens to police
officers who unlawfully intimidate videographers, he did not
comprehensively describe how police officers have to answer for their
121
actions.
Balko did not literally mean that nothing happens
122
Rather,
following an incident between police and videographers.
he meant that police officers do not face serious consequences for
123
their actions.
This Part discusses how the present framework of
safeguards designed to deter police officers from harassing citizens
fails to adequately protect videographers who are unlawfully
intimidated by police. Specifically, this Part will cover the failure of
three safeguards: first, the external check provided by the public at
large; second, self-policing mechanisms such as internal affairs; and
third, the civil remedy available to citizens who believe a public
official has violated their constitutional rights. This Part will
demonstrate how each of these deterrents is ineffective at curbing
potential police misconduct toward videographers.
A. Safeguard #1: Public Oversight and How Police Can Defeat Its
Purpose by Eliminating Public Recording of Their Conduct
Some scholars argue that allowing citizens to freely videotape
police in public incentivizes police officers to properly fulfill their
124
duties. Leaders at some police departments have adopted this view
125
as well.
For instance, Lieutenant Robin Larson of the Broward
County, Florida, Sheriff’s Office, takes the position that “[a]ll of our
people should be conducting themselves like they are being recorded
126
all the time.”
With the persistent threat of surveillance, rational
police officers would want to avoid committing any misconduct in
public because video documentation of that misconduct could be
127
widely disseminated very rapidly. In that event, the general public,
to confiscate equipment, and, perhaps, to arrest filmers for violating non-speech laws
of general applicability.”).
121
See Stossel, supra note 92.
122
See id.
123
See id.
124
Mishra, supra note 104, at 1553.
125
Johnson, supra note 49 (quoting Lieutenant Robin Larson of the Broward
County, Florida Sheriff’s Office).
126
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
127
See Rowinski, supra note 48 (“[W]ith the advent of media-sharing websites like
Facebook and YouTube, the practice of openly recording policy activity has become
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aware of the misconduct, could utilize the political process to
pressure law enforcement officers to respect the limits of their
128
Thus, mindful of potential public scrutiny and scorn,
authority.
police officers would generally avoid performing illegal activities to
129
protect themselves.
The existence of some press coverage and public scrutiny of
police misconduct indicates that this deterrent is somewhat effective,
but the evidence of police-videographer confrontations in the news
and on the Internet suggests that police are undermining the
130
effectiveness of video by attempting to eliminate it. By intimidating
and arresting videographers, police are creating more footage of
police-videographer confrontations, but may also be preventing
footage of more alarming misconduct, such as the beatings of Jack
131
McKenna or Rodney King, from being created in the first place. An
example is the case of Emily Good, a Rochester woman whose video132
confrontation with police garnered national attention.
Rochester
police officers arrested Good for obstructing governmental
administration when she filmed a traffic stop directly outside her
133
home. Good was somewhat of a social activist, and filmed the traffic
134
Police
stop because she believed it involved racial profiling.
commanded Good to stop recording the incident, but when she

commonplace.”).
128
Wasserman, supra note 14, at 645 (“Public attention and outrage produces
government action . . . . [A]ttention and outrage are more likely when video has
gone “viral” and is being devoured and dissected on YouTube, blogs, and the
mainstream news media, and where visceral public reaction to the video reflects a
wide popular interpretation of the video as showing governmental misconduct. A
viral video puts government on its heels, forcing it to publicly defend its officers (at
least initially), while also recognizing that, because of the video, the people have
developed informed perceptions and conclusions about the incident—perceptions
that officials must respect (or at least consider) in making administrative
decisions.”).
129
See id.
130
See Rowinski, supra note 48 (“There are no hard statistics for video recording
arrests. But the experiences of Surmacz and Glik highlight what civil libertarians call
a troubling misuse of the state’s wiretapping law to stifle the kind of street-level
oversight that cellphone and video technology make possible.”).
131
Cf. Adam Cohen, Should Videotaping the Police Really Be a Crime?, TIME, Aug. 4,
2010,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2008566,00.html;
Blackburn, supra note 79.
132
Ray Levato, Emily Good to Sue Rochester Police Department, WHEC ROCHESTER
(June 28, 2011), http://www.whec.com/news/stories/s2176499.shtml.
133
Id.
134
Id. (the traffic stop in front of Good’s home involved three white police
officers arresting a lone black man and searching his car).
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135

continued one of the officers arrested her.
Although a highly
publicized discussion about Good’s rights sprouted from the
incident, police successfully frustrated Good’s original purpose for
136
filming—to monitor racial profiling by police officers. By arresting
Good, the Rochester police officers succeeded in preventing her
137
from documenting anything related to racial profiling.
The Good case highlights why the public-oversight deterrent
138
fails to protect videographers from harassment and intimidation.
Instead of incentivizing officers to conduct their police business
properly, the presence of a video camera may actually encourage a
139
police officer to prevent the creation of footage of his conduct. To
do so, the police officer may harass, intimidate, and arrest the
videographer, thereby shielding himself from liability for other
140
potentially serious acts of misconduct.
While some videographers
may be defiant and willing to resist police pressures, many individuals
may simply seek to avoid confrontation and move on with their
141
lives. The ultimate result is a chilling effect on the filming of police
in public.
Concededly, if the footage of the police officer attacking the
videographer is as offensive as the Rodney King beating, the public
142
would probably demand accountability in a similar manner.
Still,
this deterrent may only be effective when videographers are
successful in capturing police misconduct that warrants unified
public outcry. Police harassment of videographers certainly warrants
public scrutiny, but because the act of intimidating a videographer is
not nearly as offensive as police beatings, shootings, or corruption
135

Id.
Id.
137
Id.
138
See Levato, supra note 132.
139
See id.; see also Rowinski, supra note 48 (quoting Sarah Wunsch of the American
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, stating that “[t]he police apparently do not
want witnesses to what they do in public”).
140
See Rowinski, supra note 48 (“Ever since the police beating of Rodney King in
Los Angeles in 1991 was videotaped. . . . the arrests of street videographers, whether
they use cellphones or other video technology, offers a dramatic illustration of the
collision between new technology and policing practices.”).
141
ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2012) (where the ACLU
did not follow through on its planned audiovisual recording of police in public
“because of a credible fear of prosecution”); Cohen, supra note 131 (“Most people
are not so game for a fight with the police. They just stop filming. These are the
cases no one finds out about, in which there is no arrest or prosecution, but the
public’s freedoms have nevertheless been eroded.”).
142
See id.
136
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143

scandals, it is not as likely to stir an equally strong public reaction.
Ideally, the issues surrounding police confrontations with
videographers ought to be resolved before more incidents similar to
Rodney King’s occur.
Another solution is needed because public awareness is not
enough to prevent police officers from intimidating and arresting
videographers.
By aggressively engaging videographers, police
effectively deter videographers from monitoring police conduct,
which simultaneously shields other types of misconduct from
144
exposure. Since the public is not as offended as it would be if other
types of misconduct were captured on camera, society is not as
motivated to remedy the situation.
B. Safeguard #2: Internal Affairs: Why Law Enforcement Self-Policing
is Insufficient
Law enforcement leadership is in a position to self-correct police
misconduct through internal investigations and disciplining police
145
officers.
In the past, police leadership has sternly held violating
146
officers accountable for their actions.
Also, some police
departments claim that the increase in public video-recording of
police conduct has positively affected change in department training
147
and staffing.
Broadly speaking, internal affairs departments have
148
sometimes been effective in combating forms of police misconduct.
While police departments should be able to self-regulate, this
established deterrent has several limitations. Most notably, in the
context of police officers harassing and intimidating videographers, it
is unlikely that any substantial consequences will result from a
149
videographer complaining to the police department. For instance,
143

See id.
See Levato, supra note 132; see also discussion supra Part IV.A.
145
See Cohen, supra note 131.
146
See id. (discussing the New York City police officer who was laid off after
amateur video footage revealed he lied in his sworn statement about how he shoved a
bicyclist to the ground); Johnson, supra note 49 (discussing the case of Jack McKenna
and the ensuing suspensions of three officers involved in the beating of the
University of Maryland student).
147
See Cohen, supra note 131 (Broward County Sheriff’s Officer Larson discusses
how recorded incidents have “sparked” activity from the department to better train
its officers).
148
See Skehill, supra note 14, at 996 (“[M]any police departments have
implemented internal affairs departments and citizen investigatory commissions to
investigate and discipline police misconduct.”).
149
See Stossel, supra note 92 (Radley Balko commenting how “nothing” happens
144
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in Emily Good’s case, Rochester Chief of Police James M. Sheppard
conducted an investigation that resulted in no announced
disciplinary action, and the Chief merely mandated additional
150
training and awareness for officers on the force.
Because the
internal investigations are not transparent, the public cannot actually
151
know if the investigations effectively resolve the problem.
Another problem with the internal affairs model for reporting
police misconduct is that in the context of video records, citizens may
152
be afraid to report.
In Massachusetts, Michael Hyde was arrested
for violating wiretapping statutes while trying to report police
153
Six days after Hyde recorded an incident with police, he
abuse.
154
filed a formal complaint at the Abington police station.
After the
Abington police department performed an internal investigation,
which absolved five of its officers, it sought a criminal complaint
against Hyde for the recording he used to complain about the
155
officers. Since Hyde’s conviction was upheld, videographers can be
156
fearful, especially in all-party-consent states, that reporting incidents
to the local police station could result in their own arrest.
Another example that demonstrates the failings of internal

to police officers who falsely arrest videographers for filming their conduct).
150
See Press Release, Rochester Police Dep’t., Chief Sheppard Announces
Outcome of Internal Administrative Reviews on Emily Good Arrest, Traffic
Enforcement
Operation
(Sept.
2,
2011),
available
at
http://www.rochestercitynewspaper.com/uploads/articles/12343-9.2.11-PressConference-Media-Packet.pdf. In a letter attached to the report, Sheppard stated
that although police officers deal with high amounts of stress and danger, they must
act professionally and with “appropriate respect for the rights of those involved.” Id.
Sheppard discussed how videographers generally have First Amendment rights to
film police officers in public spaces, and that police officers “should assume that
someone is watching and recording [their] actions at all times.” Id. But police
officers are to use “good judgment” to determine when those individuals recording
them cross the line into obstructing justice. Id.
151
See generally THE CITY OF N.Y. COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE
CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, ANATOMY
FAILURE:
A
PATH
FOR
SUCCESS
(1994),
available
at
OF
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCIQ
FjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.parc.info%2Fclient_files%2FSpecial%2520Reports
%2F4%2520-%2520Mollen%2520Commission%2520%2520NYPD.pdf&ei=ZiVpULmHH6nC0QH1p4HwAw&usg=AFQjCNF9N3sXOxbKQ
oBJVLzpZk5jrB833w&sig2=dJjggMgRkD9GBQ9I9P9fKQ&cad=rja.
152
See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Mass. 2001).
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
See supra Part II.
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investigations is the case of Anthony Graber in Maryland. Maryland
State Police raided Graber’s home and seized his camera and
computer equipment after he posted a YouTube video of a plain158
clothed police officer stopping Graber on a highway.
Graber was
facing more than fifteen years in prison if he was convicted of
159
Fortunately for
violating Maryland’s anti-wiretapping statute.
Graber, Circuit Judge Emory Pitt threw out the four-count indictment
160
against Graber.
Although Graber was ultimately vindicated, the
prospect of spending over fifteen years in prison for what may have
161
been First Amendment protected activity is quite disturbing.
If a
different Judge presided over his case, it is very possible that Graber
162
Although
would be sitting in prison until approximately 2026.
Graber was not reporting police misconduct to the police, the effort
by police to arrest Graber long after the traffic stop indicates that if
Graber had tried to report police conduct like Hyde did, he may have
163
been arrested in the same manner. Any videographer with footage
of police misconduct might be hesitant to bring such footage to the
attention of police if it may jeopardize his freedom.
Overall, law enforcement self-policing is unreliable in
safeguarding against police aggression toward videographers. Police
officers are typically not harshly punished for violating the rights of
videographers and the reporting mechanism for concerned citizens
164
poses too great of a risk of arrest. If a citizen wishes to complain to
the police about an officer’s conduct, he may hesitate to bring his
video evidence of the alleged misconduct. With no reason to take
internal investigations seriously and the substantial risks involved in
bringing video evidence to the police’s attention, it is unlikely that

157

See generally State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7 (Md.
Cir. Sept. 27, 2010).
158
See Sanchez, supra note 51.
159
See generally supra note 59.
160
Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *6, 34–35 (remarking that Graber’s
arguments are correct—that Maryland’s wiretap statute “on its face is
unconstitutional; that it is unconstitutional and violative of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution.”).
161
Id. The fact that Graber’s violation was punishable up to fifteen years in
prison is disturbing because Graber would be subject to the same sentence if he
committed robbery, and a shorter sentence if he committed sexual assault in the
third degree. MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW §§ 3-307, 402 (West 2006).
162
See id.
163
Compare Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Mass. 2001), with
Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *3–4.
164
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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internal affairs can properly deter police officers from violating
videographers’ rights to film police in public.
C. Safeguard #3: The Shortcomings of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil
Remedies
165

As part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Congress enacted 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to provide civil remedies for citizens whose rights have
166
been abused “under the color” of state law.
The statute allows a
private citizen to sue for damages and prospective relief against
167
municipalities and local governments when officials violate his or
168
her civil rights.
Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive
rights; rather, it is merely a remedy or method for citizens to
169
In
vindicate their rights as guaranteed by the Constitution.
defining the remedy, the Supreme Court has noted that § 1983 is
170
intended to financially compensate victims of official misconduct.
When a lawsuit is filed against a police officer in his official
capacity, the suit is known as an “official-capacity suit” and is treated
171
as a suit against the government itself.
To prevail in a § 1983
official-capacity suit, a plaintiff must show that “the entity’s policy or
172
custom played a part in the violation of federal law.” Thus, for the
government to be liable, the Supreme Court requires that the agent
directly harm the plaintiff on behalf of the government and that the
“moving force” behind the agent’s action be a government
173
implemented policy, statement, regulation, or custom.
Besides a
165

Civil Rights Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
241, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1988 (2006)). The Civil Rights Act of 1871 is also
known as the “Ku Klux Klan Act.” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985).
166
42 U.S.C. § 1983; Ian D. Forsythe, A Guide to Civil Rights Liability Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983: An Overview of Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit Precedent, THE
CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, http://www.constitution.org/brief/forsythe_42-1983.htm
(last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
167
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 668 (1978).
168
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 179–80 (1961).
169
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144–45 & n.3 (1979).
170
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254–55 (1978). Notably, the Court has held
that punitive damages may not be awarded against a municipality. City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259–60 (1981). Fortunately for plaintiffs, the Civil
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 allows a citizen to receive attorney’s fees if
he prevails, meaning receives more than nominal damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b);
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992).
171
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165
(1985).
172
Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
173
Monell, 436 U.S at 690–94.
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direct policy endorsing unlawful conduct, a failure to properly train
agents and employees can be a “moving force” behind the agent’s
174
wrongful conduct. The failure to train must amount to “deliberate
indifference,” however, meaning that the government entity made a
deliberate choice to not train police officers with respect to the
175
violated right in question. But, § 1983 plaintiffs will not succeed in
showing “deliberate indifference” where a police officer’s conduct is
176
“obvious to all without training or supervision.”
177
Scholars doubt whether § 1983 is an effective remedy. Absent
a discoverable pattern of violations, in order to claim that the
government was “deliberately indifferent,” the plaintiff would have to
show that the failure to train officers made violations of federal rights
178
“highly predictable.”
This requirement is farcical because the
existence of a pattern does not change the fact that an individual’s
rights have been violated in one specific instance. A pattern, by
definition, requires multiple occurrences of linkable events, but the
plaintiff in any given § 1983 suit should not need to worry about
anyone else’s violated rights. Whether others have had their rights
similarly violated is irrelevant with regard to compensating an
individual for his injuries. Attempting to prove that a failure to train
made the commission of violations “highly predictable” further
179
deteriorates protection of individual constitutional rights.
Similarly, to determine if a violation is “highly predictable,” the court
174

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89 (1989).
Id.; Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489–90 (11th Cir. 1997).
Since the Supreme Court rejected respondeat superior liability for municipalities,
the aggrieved plaintiff must prove that the municipality somehow trained or was
“deliberately indifferent” toward training police officers. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
176
Sewell, 117 F.3d at 490 (quoting Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 299–
300 (2d Cir. 1992). For instance, a police officer molesting young women at traffic
stops and in the police station qualified as obviously wrongful conduct “without
training or supervision.” Id.
177
See Laurie. L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2001); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without
Remedies: Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 755, 773–777 (1998-1999).
178
Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 265 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Berg v.
Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d. Cir. 2000)).
179
See Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997) (“Where a plaintiff
claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has
caused an employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be
applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its
employee.”); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 519 (5th ed. 2007)
(stating that “Brown articulate[d] a heightened requirement for causation, but [did]
not define it with any precision”).
175
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will determine if the propensity to arrest videographers is a “plainly
obvious consequence” of the government entity’s decision-making
180
This attenuated process ultimately circles back to
procedures.
searching for a pattern of violations in the past, which, as discussed,
181
seems unrelated to the fact that the plaintiff’s rights were violated.
Although municipalities may be held liable under some
circumstances, individual officers may be shielded from liability by
182
the doctrine of qualified immunity.
The qualified-immunity
doctrine is intended to shield public officials from harassment,
distraction, and liability when they are legitimately performing their
183
duties.
Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from
personal liability when their actions arise out of discretionary
184
functions.
To circumvent a police officer’s qualified-immunity
defense, the plaintiff must show or allege a violation of a “clearly
established” constitutional right at the time of the police officer’s
185
alleged violation. Determining if a constitutional right was “clearly
established” requires two separate inquiries: whether the law was clear
at the time of the alleged civil rights violation; and whether a
reasonable police officer would have understood that his conduct
186
violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
In examining the “clearly established” requirement, the clarity of
the law at the time of the alleged violation must be narrowly
187
determined with respect to the specific facts of the case.
A broad
and generalized conceptualization of the law is not sufficient to deny
188
This standard, however, does not
an officer qualified immunity.
180

See Brown, 520 U.S. at 398–99; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10
(1989).
181
See Brown, 520 U.S. at 413–14 (explicating that attempting to determine
whether the hiring of a particular police officer involved a highly predictable
consequence, the Court discussed the relevance of the hiree’s background and
pattern of violence in relation to violating constitutional rights).
182
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (using the term “good faith
immunity” which is synonymous with “qualified immunity”). A police officer is
entitled to qualified immunity unless he acted “so obviously wrong, in light of
preexisting law, that only a plainly incompetent officer or one who was knowingly
violating the law would have done such a thing.” Lassiter v. Ala. A & M Univ. Bd. of
Trs., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994).
183
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
184
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
185
See Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Barton v.
Clancy, 632 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2011).
186
Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 269.
187
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001).
188
Id.
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require that a prior court decision be on point.
The Supreme
Court’s decision in Hope v. Pelzer established that firm precedent is
190
The
not necessary for a plaintiff to recover against an official.
reasonableness of a police officer’s actions depends on “whether the
state of the law at the time of the alleged violation gave the [officer]
191
fair warning that his particular conduct was unconstitutional.”
Despite the plaintiff-friendly standard developed in Hope, the
absence of cases on point is still a basis for dismissal on qualified
192
immunity grounds.
In dismissing the claim because of qualified
immunity in Brosseau v. Haugen, the Supreme Court stressed the lack
of similar cases where a police officer shot and wounded the plaintiff,
193
who alleged that this violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The
Court’s dissension with its own decision in Hope has created
confusion in lower courts and clouded the “clearly established”
194
standard for qualified immunity.
Often, police officers will have
qualified immunity, which creates a nearly absolute bar against
195
In practice,
receiving damages from an individual police officer.
“[t]he qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken
judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who
196
knowingly violate the law.”
Essentially, if the law is confusing,
197
police officers may be able to invoke qualified immunity.
Regarding incidents involving recording police, some courts
have allowed arresting officers to invoke qualified immunity after
198
wrongful conduct. An example is Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, where a
police officer arrested a passenger and seized his camera for filming

189

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
Id. (declaring that “[a]lthough earlier cases involving ‘fundamentally similar’
facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion that the law is clearly
established, they are not necessary to such a finding”). In Hope, the Supreme Court
found an Eighth Amendment violation where the plaintiff prisoner was tied to a
hitching post and taunted by police. Id.
191
Id.
192
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004).
193
Id. at 199–201.
194
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 179, at 555.
195
See Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2005).
196
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
197
See Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir. 2010)
(“Considering the proliferation of laws and their relative complexity in the context
of a rapidly changing world, we cannot fairly require police officers in the field to be
as conversant in the law as lawyers and judges.”).
198
See id. at 252; Skoog v. Cnty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir.
2006).
190
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199

the officer during a traffic stop. Maintaining the officer’s qualified
immunity, the Third Circuit recognized a broad right to videotape
police but not a “clearly established” right due to the confusing state
200
of the law. Because the case law was murky, a reasonably competent
officer could not be put on “fair notice” that seizing a camera and
201
arresting the videographer would violate the First Amendment.
Additionally, after the police officer initially seized the passenger’s
camera, he called the Assistant District Attorney to inquire whether
202
the passenger actually violated Pennsylvania’s anti-wiretap statute.
Unfortunately, the Assistant District Attorney misunderstood the law
203
and recommended that the police officer arrest the passenger.
Although this fact supports the officer’s reasonableness in making the
final arrest, the officer still seized the camera before contacting the
204
local prosecutor. If the police officer inquired before confiscating
the videographer’s camera, it would be difficult to argue that his
205
conduct was unreasonable.
That was not the case, but,
206
nevertheless, the police officer was vindicated.
In circumstances where a § 1983 litigant is successful, the statute
permits courts to fashion a range of both legal and equitable
207
remedies, but severely limits injunctive relief.
Specifically, federal
208
courts are not in a position to enjoin municipal police departments.
199

Kelly, 622 F.3d at 251–52 (exemplifying a case where the police officer
believed the passenger’s conduct violated Pennsylvania’s anti-wiretap statute).
200
Id. at 262.
201
Id. at 251–52.
202
Id.
203
Id. The assistant district attorney who misunderstood the law would probably
be shielded from § 1983 liability under the doctrine of absolute immunity for
officials with prosecutorial functions. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 (1976).
204
Kelly, 622 F.3d at 252.
205
The Third Circuit held that “a police officer who relies in good faith on a
prosecutor’s legal opinion that the arrest is warranted under the law is presumptively
entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. at 255–56. However, the holding applies
specifically to Fourth Amendment claims premised on lack of probable cause. Id. at
256. Still, the police officer’s reliance on a prosecutor’s advice must be objectively
reasonable. Id.
206
Id. Kelly was remanded to allow the plaintiff to rebut the presumption that the
police officer’s contact with the local prosecutor reasonably justified his conduct. Id.
at 266.
207
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
208
See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378–79 (1976) (holding that where the
district court “injected itself by injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary affairs
of [the] state agency,” it departed from the principles of federalism “which play such
an important part in governing the relationship between federal courts” and state
governments). But see ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2012)
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Without injunctive relief, successful plaintiffs could seek
compensatory damages for injuries, but in order for the court to
209
award damages, the plaintiff must suffer actual harm. Additionally,
the Supreme Court has permitted plaintiffs to recover punitive
damages from individual police officers, but not from
210
municipalities. However, punitive damages are only available from
an individual officer where his “conduct is shown to be motivated by
evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous
211
indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”
For videographers whose rights to film have been violated, §
1983 remedies are not very helpful. First, losing the ability to film
does not constitute what is typically considered an “actual injury”
212
deserving of compensation. In Carey v. Piphus, despite finding that
the plaintiffs were denied due process when they were wrongly
suspended from school, the Supreme Court granted only nominal
213
damages because the plaintiffs lacked evidence of actual injury.
Subsequently, the Court interpreted Carey as denying any concept of
214
presumed damages.
Comparably, in Memphis Community School
District v. Stachura, the Supreme Court solidified the Carey principle
when it concluded that damages under § 1983 exist only to
compensate plaintiffs who are actually injured, noting that “damages
based on the ‘value’ or ‘importance’ of constitutional rights are not
215
authorized . . . because they are not truly compensatory.”
Punitive damages are similarly unattainable because of the
ambiguous “evil motive or intent” standard, the limitation on
collecting damages from municipalities, and the likelihood that
216
qualified immunity will shield an offending officer.
Therefore,
because First Amendment rights such as free speech and newsgathering cannot be monetized, § 1983 fails to adequately protect
217
aggrieved videographers.
Although § 1983 initially appears to provide the means for an
(reversing and remanding to the district court with instructions to enjoin law
enforcement from enforcing the Illinois eavesdropping statute against the ACLU).
209
See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978).
210
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 265 (1981).
211
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
212
See Carey, 435 U.S. at 258.
213
Id. at 258.
214
Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 309 (1986).
215
Id. at 309 n.13 (citation omitted).
216
See supra text accompanying notes 194–95, 208–09.
217
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 179, at 599.
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appropriate remedy, it is unworkable for videographers because the
burden for establishing a municipality’s liability is too heavy, qualified
immunity shields offending officers, and courts do not provide
adequate damages when officers violate constitutional rights. Since
the likelihood of a plaintiff receiving compensation for his injury is
rather diminished, it follows that the rules of § 1983 seem to favor
protecting police officers who did not know or care that a right
existed over preservation of the right itself. Absent a prescribed
remedy for violations, § 1983 fails to safeguard against unreasonable
218
law enforcement intrusions.
Although § 1983 was promulgated to
address citizens’ grievances for violations of their constitutional
rights, in the context of citizens filming police, it fails to remedy
anything, which results in no deterrence for police officers and no
protection for videographers.
V. BRIGHT-LINE RULE: EXPLICITLY STATED REMEDIES AND PERSONAL
LIABILITY
The purpose of this Part is to provide a model legislative
framework for protecting videographers against police harassment.
First, this Part will discuss the rationale behind the model and how
the legislation should meet the shortcomings of § 1983 civil rights
actions. Then, this Part will present the model legislation itself,
which state governments could consider, amend, and enact to protect
videographers from police intimidation.
A. Considerations in Constructing a Videographer Protection Law
Police should be deterred from intimidating and harassing
219
videographers who film their conduct in public.
To effectively
deter police officers, the choice of whether or not to violate an
individual’s rights must be eliminated from a reasonable police
officer’s mind. In deciding whether or not to act in a certain
situation, a police officer likely balances interests of privacy, safety,
and self-preservation. Accordingly, a police officer is effectively
deterred if in the interest of self-preservation he chooses not to
violate a videographer’s First Amendment rights.
218

See Skehill, supra note 14, at 994.
See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting City of Houston
v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987)) (alluding to society’s expectation that police are to
endure significant burdens caused by citizens exercising their First Amendment
rights, Judge Lipez discusses how police are expected to endure criticism and public
scrutiny while exercising a higher level of restraint than normal citizens).
219
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The Framers of the Constitution recognized that police power
220
could potentially be abused, and in turn, harm free society.
Communities entrust police officers with powers that are sometimes
221
abused.
Permitting individuals to record interactions with police
without fear of prosecution is essential to balancing the government’s
need to enforce laws with a citizen’s right to be free from government
222
abuse.
When abuses occur, police officers ought to be fully
223
Protecting certain police interests,
accountable for their actions.
such as privacy when performing official public functions, is
“inconsistent with democracy and democratic political accountability”
when it results in a violation of a private citizen’s guaranteed First
224
Amendment rights.
Police should not be insulated from
225
consequences when their conduct is unlawful.
Instead, police
officers’ discretionary power should be reduced so that they have less
of an opportunity to harm citizens’ First Amendment rights without a
226
challenge.
In the narrow context of protecting citizens who are filming
police officers in the public discharge of their duties, an effective
means of deterring police misconduct would be a strict law that
punishes police officers who harass, intimidate, oppress, or arrest an
individual because the individual is video-recording police conduct.
Legislatures, in constructing their respective laws, should weigh
interests such as police safety, the lawfulness of the videographer’s
overall conduct, and the general context of the incident. But to be

220

See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (“Civil liberties, as
guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society
maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of
unrestrained abuses.”).
221
See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 612–14 (1961) (discussing how
the Fourth Amendment is a constitutional guarantee against overreaching actions on
behalf of law enforcement); Morris v. Super. Ct., 129 Cal. Rptr. 238, 243 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1976) (noting how the framers of the Constitution recognized a need for a
safeguard to protect citizens from “unfettered and unreasonable” police conduct).
222
See Skehill, supra note 14, at 993–94.
223
Id. at 1011.
224
Wasserman, supra note 14, at 650.
225
Id.
226
See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1051 (1991) (citing Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58, 361 (1983)) (“[H]istory shows that speech is
suppressed when either the speaker or the message is critical of those who enforce
the law.”); see also King v. Ambs, 519 F.3d 607 (6th Cir. 2008) (where plaintiff’s
outrageous conduct while he was filming, but not the filming itself, rendered his
speech unprotected); McCormick v. City of Lawrence, No. 02-2135, 2008 WL
2795134 (D. Kan. July 18, 2008) (same).
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effective, the primary objective of the law must be to protect a
videographer’s right to be free from police abuse.
A categorical prohibition on police conduct would be
problematic because police action against a videographer is
227
sometimes appropriate.
But such circumstances must be narrowly
construed.
A broad exception based on soft standards like
228
“reasonableness” could render the entire law useless.
To help
prevent this from happening, legislatures should define possible
229
exceptions to the rule as affirmative defenses.
These exceptions
could include instances where the videographer was simultaneously
breaking some other criminal statute or situations where the police
officer or videographer would be in direct, impending danger
230
without the officer’s intervention.
Under this model, defendant
police officers carry the burden of proving that their conduct did in
fact fall within the exception for what otherwise is an unlawful
231
violation of a citizen’s First Amendment rights.
Since First Amendment limitations—such as time, place, and
manner restrictions, and murky wiretapping statutes—tend to
obfuscate the First Amendment, a presumption should exist that
232
protects openly filming the police officer’s public conduct.
This
presumption would provide the law with a “tie-goes-to-the-runner”
233
judgment mechanism which leans toward protecting videographers.
“Tie goes to the runner” would mean that where the First
Amendment right’s existence is subject to close dispute, the conduct
should go undisturbed by police. Of course, other conduct unrelated
to the act of filming may open a videographer to police interference.
Possible exceptions that allow a police officer to interfere with a
227

See generally Mishra, supra note 104.
See S.B. 245, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2012), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/FC/2012SB-00245-R000271-FC.htm; Timothy B. Lee,
Hold Cops Personally Liable for Camera Arrests? Connecticut Bills Says Yes, ARS TECHNICA
(Apr. 25, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/04/hold-cops-personallyliable-for-camera-arrests-connecticut-bill-says-yes/.
229
See Conn. S.B. 245; Lee, supra note 228.
230
See Conn. S.B. 245; Lee, supra note 228.
231
But see Conn. S.B. 245 (Connecticut’s bill does not indicate whether the
burden of proof rests on the party bringing a claim or the defending peace officer).
232
See supra Part II.
233
“Tie goes to the runner” refers to an unwritten rule in baseball where if a play
is so close that an umpire cannot determine whether the base runner was safe before
a fielder made a tag, the umpire rules in favor of the base runner. David Wade,
Inside the Rules: Tie Goes to the Runner, HARDBALL TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010,
http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/blog_article/inside-the-rules-tie-goes-to-therunner/.
228
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videographer’s filming of his conduct, however, should revolve
around actual, not theoretical, threats to the safety of the
videographer, the police officer, or other citizens as well as
enforcement of other citizens’ privacy rights.
Additionally, for the law to be effective as a deterrent, the
remedy must be appropriate. Although the remedy must aim, in
part, to offer some compensation to the aggrieved videographer, the
remedy should primarily punish the violating police officer who
234
offended the videographer’s First Amendment rights.
Unless the
harm to the videographer can actually be categorized under other
forms of misconduct, such as brutality, the mere intimidation and
arrest of the videographer should result in direct damages against the
violating police officers and a short suspension from field duty. This
degree of punitive treatment would create a greater deterrent effect
than internal investigations, which, at times, merely lead to additional
235
training without any actual discipline.
Besides adequate deterrence, the state laws should also seek to
fill in the holes left by § 1983 and the federal courts. Since § 1983
fails to adequately provide damages for those who suffer no injury
besides a violated constitutional right, legislatures should incorporate
236
liquidated or presumed damages into the statute.
In terms of
avoiding problems that qualified immunity causes, automatic liability
eliminates the shield and simultaneously bypasses the entire debate
237
about “clearly established” laws.
If a state passes the model
legislation below, the state would essentially remove the narrow issue
of filming police officers from the complicated and cloudy realms of
federalism and constitutional law. Lastly, considering how state
legislatures may be cautious to micro-manage executive-operated
agencies, liability for the municipalities is not part of the legislation.
The rationale for this omission centers around law enforcement’s
238
inability to effectively self-police and combats individual police
239
officers’ temptations to violate videographers’ rights.
234

See supra Part II.
See Press Release, supra note 150 (despite national attention drawn from the
Good incident, Rochester Police Chief James Sheppard merely indicated that police
officers would receive additional training and procedural guidance on how to resolve
similar future incidents but did not state that the offending officers would receive
any discipline for their misconduct).
236
See supra Part IV.C.
237
See supra Part IV.C.
238
See supra Part IV.B.
239
See supra Part III.
235
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B. Model “Videographer Intimidation Protection Act”
Below is the “Videographer Intimidation Protection Act” or the
“V.I.P. Act.”
The following is a hypothetical construction of
legislation that could effectively deter police from violating
videographers’ First Amendment right to openly film police conduct
in public:
Section 1: [Violation] No law enforcement officer, in the
scope of his or her official duties, shall:
(a) abridge the right of an individual to video-record
(including audio) his or her conduct, or the conduct
of other police officers in a public place;
(b) harass, intimidate, abuse, question, or arrest any
private citizen for the purposes of stopping, inhibiting,
or preventing an individual from recording any lawenforcement officer’s conduct in a public place; or
(c) demand or require an individual to turn off his or
her camera or otherwise stop filming for the purpose
of stopping, inhibiting, or preventing an individual
from recording any law enforcement officer’s conduct
in a public place;
Section 2: [Defenses] A law enforcement officer may
present any of the following affirmative defenses:
(a) The existence of an actual, not theoretical, threat
of impending harm to the police officer that is
materially related to the videographer’s act of filming;
(b) The existence of an actual, not theoretical, threat
of impending harm to the videographer that is
materially related to the videographer’s act of filming;
(c) The existence of an actual, not theoretical, threat
of impending harm to a nearby third party that is
materially related to the videographer’s act of filming;
(d) A valid reason exists to confront the videographer,
outside of his act of filming, including but not limited
to a violation of a criminal statute that is unrelated to
recording a law-enforcement officer’s conduct; or
(e) Enforcing the privacy rights of private citizens, or a
criminal anti-wiretapping statute as it pertains to
private citizens, but not of any public official acting in
his or her official capacity.
Section 3: [Evidence] In the event that the law-enforcement
officer destroys the recording and cannot meritoriously
assert an affirmative defense, liability is automatically
attached to the violating law enforcement officer.
Section 4: [Penalty] Where a law-enforcement officer is

MURPHY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

1/9/2013 3:33 PM

COMMENT

355

found to have violated this statute, the law-enforcement
officer is to be:
(a) held personally liable, in an action at law, or suit in
equity, for no less than $1,000 but no more than
240
$2,500, and
(b) suspended from public duty for at least three days
but no more than twenty-one days.
For inspiration in constructing a “V.I.P. Act,” state legislatures
241
could refer to the model act described above, or to Connecticut’s
recently passed “Act Concerning the Recording of Police Activity By
242
the Public,” (the “Connecticut Act”).
The newly passed law,
effective as of October 1, 2012, provides:
A peace officer who interferes with any person taking a
photographic or digital still or video image of such peace
officer or another peace officer acting in the performance
of such peace officer’s duties shall . . . be liable to such
person in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper
243
proceeding for redress.
Additionally, the text of the law provides five broad exceptions to
244
A police officer, if he or she has “reasonable grounds,”
liability.
may interfere with a videographer in order to:
(1) [L]awfully enforce a criminal law of [the] state or a
municipal ordinance, (2) protect the public safety, (3)
preserve the integrity of a crime scene or criminal
investigation, (4) safeguard the privacy interests of any
person, including a victim of a crime, or (5) lawfully
enforce court rules and policies of the Judicial Branch with
respect to taking a photograph, videotaping or otherwise
245
recording an image in facilities of the Judicial Branch.
Many similarities between the Model “V.I.P. Act” and the
Connecticut Act are plainly visible. Each is intended to allow

240

These figures were determined based on median pay for patrol officers in the
United States. With the median salary at approximately $50,000 per year, a
discretionary penalty between two and five percent of annual pay is appropriate for
deterrence purposes but not devastating to the officer’s well-being. See Police Patrol
Officer—U.S. National Averages, SALARY.COM, http://www.salary.com/police-officerSalary.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
241
See supra Part V.B.
242
S.B. 245, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2012), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/FC/2012SB-00245-R000271-FC.htm.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
Id.
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“individuals to bring civil suits against peace officers who interfere
with the . . . recording of their actions in the course of their duties,”
246
and each creates sensible exceptions for officers who act lawfully.
The inspiration and reasoning behind the texts are similar as well.
Connecticut State Senator Eric Coleman, who sponsored the
Connecticut Act, cited the Rodney King beatings, as well as another
incident in which a Catholic priest was arrested for filming officers, as
247
motivation for developing the legislation.
Additionally, the
Connecticut Senate rejected an amendment that would have created
an exception for police officers arresting an individual whose actions
248
caused “inconvenience or alarm.”
Concerned that the legislation
would be rendered “toothless,” critics argued that such an exception
249
was too broad, and perhaps resembled laws of general applicability.
Overall, the Connecticut Act’s inspiration seems aligned with many of
the concerns that underlie the construction of the “V.I.P. Act.”
Although the “V.I.P. Act” and the Connecticut Act share many
elements, one major difference is notable—the Connecticut Act
embraces indemnification of individual officers whereas the “V.I.P.
250
Act” rejects indemnification.
Connecticut’s legislature
acknowledges that public servants are generally indemnified from
civil action and provides, in its explanation, that the Connecticut Act
potentially creates civil actions where the “law enforcement agency is
251
liable for damages and legal costs.” In effect, the Connecticut Act
permits a state form of qualified immunity to persist because it
provides that “[o]fficers found liable . . . are entitled . . . to
indemnification (repayment) . . . if they were acting within their
scope of authority and the conduct was not willful, wanton, or
252
reckless.” While the Connecticut Act’s construction is subject to the
Connecticut
legislature’s
discretion,
state-acknowledged
indemnification and repayment to violating officers may render the
253
Connecticut Act less potent than it otherwise could be.

246

Id.
See Lee, supra note 228; see also supra Part IV.A.
248
Lee, supra note 228; see supra Part III.
249
Lee, supra note 228; see supra Part III.
250
S.B. 245, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2012), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/FC/2012SB-00245-R000271-FC.htm; see supra Part IV.C,
V.A–B.
251
Conn. S.B. 245.
252
Id.
253
See supra Part IV.C.
247
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VI. CONCLUSION
A First Amendment right to film police officers in public exists
254
and should be universally protected.
From case law and scholarly
legal commentary, it is more than reasonable to conclude that the
right exists and, subject to some narrow limitations, should not be
255
abridged.
However, individuals’ First Amendment rights are
256
This occurs because police officers have
sometimes violated.
interests in resisting the legal trend that private citizens have a right
257
to film police officers in public.
Police frequently escape liability when they abuse their power
because the legal landscape is proving to be an enabling
258
environment.
That environment, combined with the growing
widespread availability of video-recording devices, has resulted in
police officers abusing their power in an effort to chill videographers’
259
actions. The current framework of deterrence fails to address this
260
chilling effect adequately. Since the deterrents are too weak, or too
avoidable, officers can often abuse their power without
261
punishment.
To resolve this problem, legislatures should pass a stricter law
which directly targets and prevents police officers from interfering
262
with videographers filming police conduct.
Had a safeguard been
enacted, perhaps citizens like Emily Good would not have been
falsely arrested for openly and unobtrusively monitoring police in the
263
public discharge of their duties.

254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Parts II–IV.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Parts II–IV.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part V.

